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ABSTRACT 
 
The preponderant thrust of academic literature on the field of Islam in South Asia often 
projects a picture of a monolithic Muslim community seamlessly pervaded by broader 
religious nationalist forces. This paper suggests, this has not always been so, especially in 
late nineteenth-early twentieth century. Using sources hitherto inadequately utilized this 
historical sketch of ideas of socio-religious reformism and political culture foregrounds a 
much more nuanced picture. The instance of the Dā‟ūdī Bohrās, a Sevener Shī„a sect, 
illustrates how one brand of epistemic construction of reform and progress was taken up 
by a different strand of politico-ethical thought, rationalizing and relocating it in a new 
interpretive paradigm. The paper studies the works of two leading Bohrā thinkers, Mulla 
Abdul Husain and Sir Adamjee Peerbhoy. The qualified absorption of Abdul Husain‟s 
sectarian reformist-revivalist ideas by Adamjee Peerbhoy, intertwined with the latter‟s 
project of reconfiguring Bohrā identity, becomes intelligible against the backdrop of 
contemporaneous politico-intellectual culture. This involved constant re-charting of the 
boundaries of the Bohrā community, eventually leading to its linkage with the broader 
South Asian umma along political lines. This paper explores the theory and praxis of 
these moments of dialogue and negotiations, tracing the labyrinthine trajectory from 
socio-religious to political orientations. In doing so, it studies the role of leaders in 
negotiating identities with critical reference to Paul Brass‟s conceptualization of 
“instrumentality” of elites in political mobilization by way of manipulating symbols, 
though not losing sight of the contextual specificities conditioning such choices, and 
examining the role of “individual rationality”.  
                                                 
1
 An earlier incarnation of this article was presented at the conference on „The Sacred and 
the Secular‟ hosted by the School of Humanities (English), University of Southampton, 19-
21September, 2008. I would like to thank the conference organizers, and Professor Subrata 
K. Mitra, Gita Dharampal-Frick, and Francis Robinson for their critical comments on 
earlier versions of this paper. 
2
 Soumen Mukherjee is Doctoral Researcher, Department of History, South Asia Institute, 
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I. PROLEGOMENA 
 
One of the major concerns of modern day scholarship in the various branches of 
social sciences is the question of challenging any grand scheme of meta-narrative. 
As a result researches on themes of community, tradition, identity, reform, or 
progress have nowadays been fragmented along both horizontal and vertical lines 
blowing off much conceptual rigidity though unfortunately, not in its totality. To 
cite an example of these vestiges of older rigidities, especially in the studies of 
Islam in South Asia, is the projection of a picture of monolithic “Indian Muslim” 
community, and of its backwardness culminating — sometimes supposedly almost 
in a linear way — in “separatism”.3 A further problem is that even the question of 
leadership is often over-simplified in such discourse. The post-1857 period, one is 
thus told, is marked among other things by the “genesis of a new Muslim 
leadership”.4  
 
The present essay suggests why such orthodoxies should be disposed of and 
the genealogy of the history of Islamic political culture in South Asia needs to be 
looked at afresh. Taking cue from P.G. Robb‟s intervention exhorting the need to 
look at the “multiple levels or degrees of identity and „other-ness‟” and compare 
“the strength and pervasiveness of religious and other identities” (Robb 1991), this 
paper investigates the variegated layers of emotive engagement within the broader 
Islamic rubric in late nineteenth-early twentieth century South Asia. It looks into 
two crucial strands of Dā‟ūdī Bohrā reformist thought.5 The life and works of Mian 
                                                 
3
 See, for instance, Hamid (1967); Zakaria (1970). By and large these works draw heavily 
upon W. W. Hunter‟s “Muslim backwardness” thesis. The first serious masterly study 
questioning the general applicability of Hunter‟s “Muslim backwardness” thesis at a pan-
Indian level came from Francis Robinson (1974), where he highlighted the role of the 
Muslims of the United Provinces (not particularly “backward” according to him), who had 
been in the vanguard of Muslim politics in the sub-continent, and showed that the idea of 
“backwardness” is essentially fragmented and flawed.  The question of heterogeneity of the 
community comes up in some other works as well. Seal (1970: 300) talks about Muslim 
heterogeneity along lines of language, caste and economic standing. Titus (1959: 87-115; 
170 ff) on the other hand talks about internal differences along sectarian lines. However, 
these works are still oblivious of the fact that the different sects or groups could interact 
between themselves on questions of “selfhood”, “reform” or even the future of the Muslims 
in South Asia in general. The theory and praxis of such interactions and the rhetorical 
tropes of the negotiations form the focus of the present investigation. Much sophisticated, 
however, is Kenneth McPherson‟s recent enquiry into religious diversity under British rule 
(2004) which deals with spatial distinctiveness, with reference to authority and power 
structure of Muslims in Calcutta and Madras, and how such distinctiveness with their 
corollaries impacted on Hindu-Muslim relations.  
4
 See Abbasi (1981). The very first chapter of the monograph is entitled “Genesis of a New 
Muslim Leadership”, where the writer talks about breaks in leadership patterns in South 
Asia‟s Muslim community; this break, one is told, is marked by the “exit of the Ulema” and 
the rise of a “new leadership” which was supposedly conditioned by “the enlightened self-
interest of the Government and the Muslim urge to progress” (M.Y. Abbasi 1981: 13). 
Implicit in this construction is the binary of “religious” (=backward)/ “secular” (= 
enlightened/ progressive).   
5
 Drawing strength from Hindu converts of Western India, the Bohrās and the Khojas form 
two Shī„a sects and constitute the Indian Ismā„līs, but were governed in matters of 
inheritance by customary and Hindu laws prior to 1937, when the Sharī„a Act came into 
effect. However, there had been numerous cases of secession especially within the Bohrā 
sect on the question of rightful religious head, resulting in the formation of the Dā‟ūdī and 
Sulaymānī groups in the sixteenth century, following Dā‟ūd bin Quṭb Shah and Shaikh 
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Bhai Abdul Husain, representing one of these strands, illustrate how questions of 
social — and more particularly of educational — reformism could be wedded to 
religious issues though drawing decisively upon European phraseology of Progress 
producing an ambivalent space in the intellectual genealogy of this community.  
 
Operating, as it was, in certain colonial historical milieu involving an active 
engagement with the colonial establishment, this was in no way the only strand of 
reformist thought; indeed, there had been parallel, and often competing, visions of 
reform among the Bohrās — concerning similar socio-religious issues with special 
focus on the authority and position of the religious head — which made their 
history in the twentieth century truly multi-faceted, thus betraying the different 
layers within the broader Islamic folds in South Asia. Mian Bhai Abdul Husain on 
the one hand, and Sir Adamjee Peerbhoy and his sons on the other, represent two 
different strands of community consciousness which could be labeled as “Islamic 
activism” and more decidedly “Islamist” respectively.6 
What adds further twist to the development of these distinctive strands of 
community consciousness is the fact that certain threads from one of these lines of 
thought would be taken up by another to validate its own position, although 
originally not intended by its author. Mulla Abdul Husain, for all his critique of the 
contemporaneous depraved state of education among the Bohrās, which he blamed 
on the subordinate priestly classes, was highly defensive about the Head-priest‟s 
(the dā„ī) position. Ironically, however, his work came to be cited by Sir 
Adamjee‟s sons in their prolonged tirade against the Head-priest, which only 
earned Abdul Husain wrath of the da„wat (mission/ retinue of the Head-priest‟s 
officials). This enquiry seeks to look into Abdul Husain‟s epistemic construction of 
reform and progress, and a specific mode of interpretation that that construction 
was subjected to in course of a politico-ethical — and later legal — construction of 
selfhood drawing inspiration from, and linking it with, broader currents of Islamic 
thoughts in the early twentieth century. In doing so, it studies leadership patterns 
and role of leaders in negotiating identities (i.e. relating to, and distancing from, 
established Islamic frameworks) with due reference to Paul Brass‟s intervention 
that conceives of a decisive degree of “instrumentality” of elites in political 
mobilization by way of manipulating symbols — a view that important as it is — 
still understates the importance of reformist-revivalist movements, highlighted by 
                                                                                                                            
Sulaymān respectively, or again, the Alīas in the following century. The etymological 
meaning of the word “Bohrā”(from vyawahar) is said to be trade, thus pointing to the 
occupational profile of the people in pre-conversion times; however, this has been 
contested, on the basis of Sunnī Bohrā traditions, that bahu rāh in Gujarati means “several 
sects or paths”, underscoring thereby the heterogeneous composition of the community 
(Lokhandwalla 1955). For a general account of the Ismā„līs, see Daftary (1990). One of the 
early attempts to understand the “interplay of history and legend and intermixture of 
Hinduism and Islam” through the prism of a “legendary history of the Bohrās” came from 
K.M. Jhaveri‟s translation of an Arabic work called Risālat al-tarjamat az-zāhira li firqati 
Bohrat al-bāhira (Jhaveri 1933). For an incisive account of the fluidity of identities, 
especially in the Indian context where one encounters different groups (e.g. the Bohrās and 
the Khojas) which could be ideally termed “liminal”, given their “intermediary” nature 
inhabiting threshold areas between broader “Hindu” and “Islamic” traditions, see 
Dominique-Sila Khan (2004: especially 5-7; 44-50).  
6
 The concepts of “Islamic activism” and “Islamist” are developed by Dietrich Reetz (2006: 
3ff.).  The former is taken to mean “active public involvement beyond personal or private 
contemplation, which is not necessarily political in nature” as typified, in the present 
instance, by Abdul Husain; this is in contrast to the category that Reetz calls “Islamist” 
which is underpinned with an intrinsic political agenda represented here by Sir Adamjee.   
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Francis Robinson.
7
 A further problem with the Brass model is its fixation with elite 
agency to the extent of somewhat circumventing the immediate contextual 
backdrop. Elite agency, as we shall see, might be crucial in bringing about any 
change, or the lack of it; but their idioms are essentially derived from the societal 
matrix which they inhabit. Drawing a picture of dynamics of “structure” and 
“agency”, and while admitting the importance of the forces of “context and 
conjuncture”, Mitra (1999: 16ff) draws attention to the “individual rationality” of 
any leadership in weaving together the strands of what could potentially entail any 
change in society. The present engagement employs this paradigm from a historical 
perspective to understand the patterns of dialogue between different individuals 
themselves, and individuals and larger society in arriving at as basic, albeit crucial, 
questions as defining boundaries of a community and the implications which they 
bore.
8
 In other words, the present enquiry, while wary of the rather overdrawn 
employment of the theory of elite manipulation, probes into a phase of South Asian 
history when contours of communities were constantly being drawn and redrawn to 
align with — or distance from depending on the socio-cultural matrix and the elite 
proclivities and choices — the socio-religious forces of the time. This becomes 
intelligible only in the light of the broader backdrop of politico-religious forces, 
and religious nationalism, a term I prefer to the rather demeaning and de-
legitimizing “communalism”, forming the veritable crucible of the 
contemporaneous theories of socio-religious reformism and community 
consciousness. But ultimately each of these actors, Abdul Husain, Sir Adamjee, or 
later his sons, had their own idea of community consciousness and development, 
and it was their “individual rationality” among other factors that translated mere 
discourses into actions, into an “Islamic activism” or an “Islamist” enterprise. This 
then is primarily a history of ideas and the realization of such ideas into action, 
with some in-built hints at functional modalities and praxis of translating the 
encoded discourses of community identity, often competing with each other as they 
were, into hardcore realities of the socio-political world.  
 
The development of Abdul Husain‟s discourse of religio-cultural “activism” 
and the kind of ambivalence it came to bear, we shall see, could be effectively 
understood by making a broadened use of the analytical framework of “hybridity”.9 
Developed by Homi K. Bhabha, and employed to understand the colonizer-
colonized relationship, the concept refers to the “ambivalent” nature of identity that 
the colonized develops in its efforts to “mimic” the colonial discourse. The 
                                                 
7
 The Brass-Robinson debate is particularly crucial in understanding the nature of Muslim 
separatism; whereas Brass attaches much importance to symbol manipulation, Robinson 
draws attention to the fundamental essential differences of Hinduism and Islam. This has 
led to the labeling of Brass and Robinson as “instrumentalist” and “primordialist” 
respectively. For some early versions of the debate see Brass (1974: 119-181; 1979: 35-77); 
Robinson (1979: 78-112). See also Brass (1991: 69-118) and Robinson (2001: 156-176). 
8
 In fact, recent investigations into communal riots and pogroms in post-colonial India by 
Brass (2003) further builds upon this elite entrepreneurship framework, but has been 
critiqued for its flawed employment of data to understand inter-communal alienations and 
overt homogenizations at pan-Indian level (Mitra 2003). 
9
 See Homi K. Bhabha (1998: especially 85-122). Bhabha‟s model is a tool to critically 
analyze the colonizer-colonized relationship and cultural traits of diasporic transnational 
communities especially in the post-colonial context; however, this paper further builds 
upon the model to understand how ambivalence in discourses — originally products of 
colonizer-colonized relationship — could also impact on relationships and patterns of 
negotiation between different threads of a colonized community. Such negotiations could 
well move beyond the ambit of “culture” and enter other realms that characterize public 
life.  
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ambivalence is due to the fact that such mimicry could never produce an exact 
copy of colonial discourse, but rather a “blurred impression”. And it is in this 
rather fuzzy sphere of “blurred impression” that the germs of multivalence of any 
discourse (which could be more than just cultural, as I suggest) emerge. The life 
and works of Abdul Husain show how cultural patterns and tropes, modeled on a 
specific understanding of the western Enlightenment project of Progress and 
Rationality having cultural roots could nevertheless eventually lead to its 
employment in the conceptualization of issues ranging from development and 
progress to self-perception and identity, which could well have religious 
underpinnings.
10
 In addition, as will be seen here, such interpretive exercises were 
not necessarily just employed as part of rhetorical engagement with the colonizer 
or its representatives; such rhetoric could be, and indeed, were actually employed 
and re-interpreted in course of dialogue between different sections of the colonized 
body as well. This explains why and how Abdul Husain‟s discourse of progress 
and reform was selectively taken up and employed by another strand of reformers 
in their crusade against the established religious leadership of the community. 
Looking into these competing discursive traditions of “progress”, “reform” and 
“identity”, and the moments of their interactions and negotiations, helps us 
reconstruct some neglected branches of the family-tree of the intellectual history of 
certain sections of South Asia‟s Muslims. It is interesting how the Bohrās and the 
Khojas, both threshold communities sharing some elements between themselves, 
came to relate to Islam at the different levels of socio-religious reformism, legal 
theory, and political consciousness. Thus, substantial part of the nineteenth century 
witnessed considerable debates among the Khojas regarding the kind of Islam to 
which to relate which found expression in a series of law cases.
11
 The Bombay 
Khojas are said to have been urged to place themselves under the Hindu Wills Act 
(XXI of 1870) following which Sir Richard Temple‟s government appointed a 
judicial commission to ascertain views of the majority of the Khoja community 
(including, as was claimed, sections living outside Bombay city) with regard to 
such enactments, which invited challenges from Aga Ali Shah, son of the Aga 
Khan.
12
 This had momentous repercussions as in due course the Khoja Succession 
                                                 
10
 It is important to note the subtle difference between Victorian scientism and Rationality, 
the supposed sources of influence for certain thought waves in South Asia, in itself and the 
connotation ascribed to it by contemporaneous generations and posterity. Indeed, scholars 
have actually unearthed a much nuanced picture of such Enlightenment discourse, often 
showing the mutually interactive nature of Christianity and naturalism. It has been shown 
(Frank Miller Turner 1974: 246-256), how a critique of Christianity could be thoroughly 
linked to a critique of naturalism as well, as an expression of disillusionment and 
“intellectual hatred” to both, deemed to evolve a third “intellectual alternative”. On the 
other hand, by tracing the origins of some of the contemporaneous reform issues, e.g. trans-
Atlantic anti-slavery movement, to Biblical morality rather than secular Enlightenment 
enterprise, Charles Taylor (1992: 399-410) contests any theory of unidirectional 
development of secularization in Victorian England. 
11
 For instance, in 1866 the Khojas came to be regarded as of Shī„a denomination. See 
Advocate General v. Muhammad Husen Huseni, (1866), 12 Bombay High Court Reporter 
(hereafter Bom. H.C.R.) 323. At the turn of the century, however, came a final showdown 
between the Twelver and Sevener Shī„a denominations. See Haji Bibi v. H.H. Sir Sultan 
Mahomed Shah, the Aga Khan, (1909) 11 Bombay Law Reporter (hereafter Bom. L.R.), 
409. Punctuating these fifty years or so came up a vast corpus of judicial debates in form of 
proceedings and so on, on the question of Khoja intestate succession, opposed equally by 
the Sunnī and Shī„a factions alike.  
12
 Justice Maxwell Melvill was the President of the commission; its members were said to 
be representing the diverging strands within the Khoja community, viz. Aga Ali Shah, 
Ahmedbhoy Hubeebbhoy, Jairazbhai Peerbhoy and Rahimtula Sayani. Later two more 
members, viz. N. Spencer and Dhurumsey Poonjabhoy were admitted at the suggestion of 
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Act of 1884 came to be drafted with a view to cover the whole of India and even 
further applicable to cases of intestate succession in the Consular jurisdictions in 
the Persian Gulf, Zanzibar and places outside British India where considerable 
number of Khojas were found, betraying thereby the State‟s concerns to arrive at 
standardization.
13
 Contrastively, the Bohrās had been subject to systematic 
secessionist tendencies on the question of rightful successor to the High-priest‟s 
position on several occasions from circa sixteenth century onwards splitting the 
community up into the Dā‟ūdī, Sulaymānī, Sunnī, Alīa, and other sections. So by 
the nineteenth century there had already been a somewhat clearer picture (at least 
in comparison with the Khojas) as to what it means, for instance, to be a Dā‟ūdī 
Bohrā as opposed to a Sunnī Bohrā. Hence there was hardly any formal 
secessionism among the Bohrās, like the Khoja case of nineteenth century. The late 
nineteenth early twentieth century rival discourses of Bohrā selfhood, therefore, 
related to issues somewhat intrinsically different from that of the Khojas.  
 
 
II. MIAN BHAI MULLA ABDUL HUSAIN: THE MENTAL WORLD OF A 
LOYALIST REFORMER 
 
The centrality of the religious leadership within the sects of the Bohrās and the 
Khojas stems from the vital question of ta‟wīl, the esoteric exegesis emanating 
from the spiritual head that would lead the initiated through different stages of 
consciousness to reach the hidden or the bāṭīni realm of knowledge. An overview 
of the pre-nineteenth and twentieth century secessionist movements within the 
Bohrās shows the essentially different nature of those instances. When in the 
sixteenth century the Bohrās broke into the rival groups of the Dā‟ūdīs and the 
Sulaymānīs, the core problem was the dispute over the question of candidature for 
the spiritual head or al-dāʻī al-muṭlaq between Dā‟ūd bin Quṭb Shah and Shaikh 
Sulaymān, the first “Indian” al-dāʻī al-muṭlaq‟s nephew and deputy in Yemen. So 
was the case with the seventeenth century schism leading to the formation of the 
Alīa group which, led by Alī broke away from the mother community led by ʻAbd 
al Ṭayyab. In each of these cases the common problem was the issue of succession 
to the position of the spiritual head. A certain claimant to the dāʻī al-muṭlaq‟s 
position could be challenged, but the pre-ordained sanctity of the position could 
not. Contrastively, much of the twentieth century reformist polemical agenda 
would hinge upon the very basic question of infallibility of the dāʻī al-muṭlaq. An 
early, but rather innocuous, incarnation of this theory comes from Mulla Abdul 
Husain who, while supportive of the Dā‟ūdī Bohrā Head-priest‟s position, was 
severely caustic about the lower priestly classes. 
 
Abdul Husain was not just another self-styled “reformer”. What makes this 
personality particularly intriguing is the multi-layered nature of his reformist-
revivalist enterprise. Thus for all his critique of the contemporaneous state of 
affairs within the Bohrā brotherhood, especially of the sphere of education, he was 
thoroughly steadfast in his defense of the Head-priest‟s authority and position. 
Writing in the early part of the twentieth century, Abdul Husain‟s Gulzare Daudi 
                                                                                                                            
the Aga Khan. Four of these members represented the Shī„a division of the Khojas, except 
for Ahmedbhoy Hubeebbhoy, who came from the Sunnī branch. „Bill for regulating 
succession and inheritance among (Khojas) of Bombay‟, Home Department, Judicial 
Branch, March 1880, Proceedings 123- 134 (A), National Archives of India (hereafter 
NAI). 
13
 India Office Records (hereafter IOR), Public & Judicial Department Records, The Khoja 
Succession Bill, 1884, L/PJ/6/131, File 1428. 
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for the Bohras of India: A Short Note on the Bohras of India, their 21 Imams and 
51 Dais, with their Customs and Tenets,
14
 posits a reformist schema that envisaged 
a clear cleavage between a subordinate priestly class and the religious head. His 
reformist intervention — verging on the edge of certain qualified revitalization — 
was occasioned by the need to address the question of the depravation of the 
priestly class, while still remaining firm in support to the Head-priest. Reflective of 
a gradual opening up of an Islamic “public arena”,15 by the late nineteenth-early 
twentieth century education had emerged as the crucially important site of 
contention between a brand of self-styled reformers and the religious leadership. 
Abdul Husain‟s reformism alleged that this degeneration of education, among other 
things, reflected the dilution of the rank and position of the mashāyikh due to 
indiscriminate conferment of that title especially on the unworthy. 
 
Regarded as “a distinguished scholar of Burhanpur Bohras”, Abdul Husain 
passed his Bachelor of Arts with Honors from the University of Calcutta, started 
his professional career as headmaster of Anjuman Islamia High School, Jabbulpur, 
and later joined the Provincial Service of the Central Provinces. He received a 
second class Kaiser-i Hind for public services in India in 1900 and came to receive 
an honorarium from the government for writing Ethnographical Survey notes in 
1906. This must have given him an exposure to — if not connected him with — the 
administrator- historians‟ craft fashionable at the time. This is not to say, his was a 
mere replication of the colonial epistemic constructs about the Dā‟ūdī Bohrās. 
While drawing upon European phraseology of Progress and Development, it was 
nevertheless meant to be a corrective supplement to an article on the Bohrās 
written by a colonial administrator-historian in volume xvii of the Ethnographic 
Survey, Central Provinces. The Gulzare Daudi, as has been noted, first came out 
around 1919-1920, and ran into a modest figure of 500 copies; in the Preface 
Abdul Husain claims that hardly any information is original while specific efforts 
were made to authenticate such information with reference to published material. 
This, however, need not be seen as a drawback hindering any appraisal of Abdul 
Husain‟s brand of reformism. In fact, it is quite the contrary. It is precisely this that 
makes his work particularly significant and adds to its strength. Different visions, 
narratives (even oral testimonies), and analytic frameworks current at the time are 
weaved together in a single cover with Abdul Husain‟s own commentary, acting at 
times as subtexts. Even a cursory glance at the range of works referred to in 
Appendix G to Abdul Husain‟s Gulzare Daudi16 is most instructive: works of 
colonial administrative-ethnographic genre, e.g. the Bombay Gazetteer, vol. ix, 
1899; Russell‟s Ethnographic Survey of Central Provinces, vol. xvii; some classics 
of Western scholarship (including, but not limited to Orientalist scholarship) like 
                                                 
14
 This undated edition consulted here says that the first edition was printed at the 
Amarsinhji Private Press, Lal Darwaza, Lalkaka Lodge, Ahmedabad by Pathan Nurkhan 
Amir Khan Vakil, and probably in 1919. The edition consulted here might be the 1921 
edition, published from Ahmedabad, but certainly not later than 1921 since it contains 
reference to an ongoing law suit, purporting to the Chandabhoy gulla Case, the verdict of 
which came out in only 1921. 
15
 Here I draw upon an expression as developed by Freitag (1989). The expression has been 
used to denote a realm “encompassing activity by locally constituted groups, and that 
structured by state institutions… an alternative world to that structured by the imperial 
regime, providing legitimacy and recognition to a range of actors and values denied place 
in the imperial order.” See S.B. Freitag (1989: 6). The concept, encompassing the 
variegated nuances of public life, characteristic of both state-created structures and beyond, 
is a corrective to the rather restrictive Habermasian bourgeois analytical framework of 
“public sphere”. 
16
 For an exhaustive list of the works drawn upon, see Abdul Husain, (n.d.: 156 ff). 
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Gibbon‟s Rise and Fall of the Roman Empire; De Sacy‟s Religion de Druzes and 
Expose; Todd‟s Western India; government reports like the Report of the 
Educational Commission of 1882 AD; and above all, tracts written in both 
European and non-European languages by other Dā‟ūdī Bohrā thinkers now 
difficult to access. This latter category includes works ranging from “history” of 
the community like Shaikh Mohamed Ali Jiwabhai‟s „Mosame Bahar‟; through 
accounts of Dā‟ūdī Bohrā customs and religious practices, e.g. the rare 1896 
edition of „Sahifatus-salat‟; down to Shaikh Faizullabhai‟s  (A) Historical Sketch of 
the Bohra Highpriests. This needs to be juxtaposed with the fact that Abdul Husain 
is not hesitant to offer his readers a glance into the once guarded bastion of 
theological pedagogic tradition at the Surat College; and in this his informal 
networks proved to be of utmost help. The list of theological books in the Surat 
College curricula, Abdul Husain thus adds, was supplied by ex-students of the 
College (n.d.: 82ff). It is this intersection of different levels of engagement with 
public life that makes Abdul Husain‟s work so important. What the reader gets in 
the end is a narrative with rich intermeshing of views flowing from the pen of both 
the compiler Abdul Husain and the author Abdul Husain, with his own brand of 
reformist agenda, and its rationalization, writ large.  
 
 
According to Abdul Husain his venture is meant to: 
 
… give a broad view of the organisation of the Bohra sect and it is hoped 
that it will be of use to the English knowing Bohras. This is intended to 
hint for them the ways and means for obtaining the correct and complete 
knowledge of the doctrine of the sect from the European point of view. 
(n.d.: 3-4) 
 
 
Let us now chart out the terrain of his intellectual concerns. He is, as is 
evident from the above quote, concerned with: Firstly, the “organisation of the 
Bohra sect”; secondly, the “English knowing Bohras”; thirdly, certain “ways and 
means for obtaining the correct and complete knowledge of the sect”; and fourthly, 
such an appreciation from the “European point of view” (italics mine). Abdul 
Husain‟s target audience, the “English knowing” Dā‟ūdī Bohrās, are thus exhorted 
to internalize a specific form of adab literature so as to appreciate in a “correct and 
complete” fashion the doctrines of their own sect. However, according to Abdul 
Husain, such literature propagating a specific brand of moral conduct with Dā‟ūdī 
Bohrā sectarian values as its core should be appreciated from a “European” 
perspective.  
 
Implicit in Abdul Husain‟s work is therefore a certain concern to impart 
among his Dā‟ūdī Bohrā brethren an adab.17 This has its roots in the essential 
components of the faith, the nurturing of which, according to Abdul Husain, helps 
one appreciating the true “knowledge of the doctrine of the sect”. But the claim 
that such appreciation should also effectively have an anchorage in the “European 
point of view”, betrays a specific form of discursive spirit in the domain of ideas, 
understanding and conduct. This concern to (re)construct or re-fashion a “tradition” 
— though originally having roots in the “religious traditions” of the community — 
along lines set by European norms is something that he shares with a whole 
generation of South Asian elite groups regardless of their “Hindu” or “Muslim” 
                                                 
17
 This notion of adab — almost inevitably referring to the “religious traditions” of a 
community — is derived from Metcalf (1984: 5). 
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background. This marriage of secular Western education with Dā‟ūdī Bohrā 
sectarian code of conduct and orthopraxy happened in, to borrow Bhabha‟s 
phraseology, “The Third Space of enunciation”18 in a way neither envisaged by the 
Bohrā priestly class whom Abdul Husain was challenging, nor the advocates of 
Anglicist learning like Lord Macaulay. For the former Western education was the 
threat to faith; for the latter, Oriental learning was utterly derisory. 
 
However, his effort to locate the reformist panacea in the sphere of education 
was certainly not the only brand of “reformism”; nor was he the only reformer 
addressing the issue of education. Somewhat echoing Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan‟s 
concerns about the Indian Muslims in general about half-a-century before, Abdul 
Husain observed that the Bohrās, though “industrious and enterprising”, were still 
mostly — some 95 per cent according to him — “bigoted religionists, 
superstitious, and ignorant…”19 The priestly class, partially educated in Arabic as 
they were, were in his schema the villain supporting “the reactionary movement 
against education” (i.e. English/ Western education). It is primarily this concern 
that occasions Abdul Husain‟s intervention. The work should not be just an eye-
opener. In addition, it must have a redemptive aspect to it, capable of setting off 
forces which could become instructive for internalization of certain values having 
potential to mould certain moral conduct. Yet this appreciation, this internalization 
to be proper and meaningful requires the Bohrā to look through Western eyes.  
 
 
III. MIAN BHAI ABDUL HUSAIN: THE MARRIAGE OF EDUCATIONAL 
REFORMS AND SECTARIAN ORTHOPRAXY 
 
For Abdul Husain a certain vision of educational reforms could, and should, be 
wedded to a certain mode of Dā‟ūdī Bohrā sectarian orthopraxy. In such a 
reformist schema the knowledge of the Dā‟ūdī Bohrā sectarian tenets and practices 
would be emphasized; its focal point — the Surat Dars — is also of typical Dā‟ūdī 
Bohrā sectarian nature. Indeed, his exclusivist vision hardly left any space for 
Aligarh or the Bombay Anjumān i Islāmia. Cut off from the broader Islamic 
politico-intellectual culture of his age, Abdul Husain wished that the Dā‟ūdī Bohrā 
sectarian traditions be re-established, and its restored pristine values be 
disseminated. This would have required efforts much in the line of 
vernacularization and concomitant dissemination of ideas, that later characterized, 
e.g. the Tablīghī Jama„āt movement (Metcalf 1993). Sadly for Abdul Husain, this 
did not happen in a scale as he would have loved it be. 
 
                                                 
18
 It is in this contradictory nay ambivalent sphere that “all cultural statements and systems” 
are said to develop. See Homi K. Bhabha (1998: 37). Its ambivalence keeps open the option 
of multiple interpretations, and indeed appropriation, of the different symbols and meanings 
of culture even in different historical contexts. As will be seen, it is in this light that the 
appropriation and eventual modification of Abdul Husain‟s critique of the Dā‟ūdī Bohrā 
religious establishment by another strand of reformism, represented by Sir Adamjee 
Peerbhoy and his sons, becomes intelligible.  
19
 See Abdul Husain (n.d.: 78). About half a century before this comment, the Report of the 
Director of Public Instruction, Bombay, for the year 1873-74 showed that out of only 22 
Muslim students in government colleges throughout the Presidency in 1874, some 4 were 
Bohrās, compared to 15 Khojas. Cited in Dobbin (1972:164). See, for the general state of 
Muslim education, Mahmood (1981 reprint: especially 147ff). 
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The resuscitation of the Dā‟ūdī Bohrā religious and sectarian pedagogic 
tradition to be effective and meaningful also required a certain infrastructural 
reorganization in the sphere of education. Abdul Husain‟s quest thus brought him 
to a study of the history of the much acclaimed Surat Dars, founded in the early 
part of the nineteenth century by Sayyidna Saif ud din, the 43
rd
 dāʻī, with a view to 
“take the advantage of the religious freedom, peace and prosperity of the British 
rule, and to spread higher sectarian education on an extensive scale, and open 
competitive system” (Abdul Husain n.d.: 75). 
 
The sectarian ethos is particularly reflected in the curriculum of the Surat 
College. Typifying this ethos, a candidate is thus first of all required to take an oath 
of allegiance, i.e. mīthāq. Only then could he go on to study simple Islamic 
theology and then at a higher level, once he proves his mettle, the allegorical bāṭīni 
exegesis of Islamic theology, and the esoteric doctrines of ḥaqīqa that is, 
truth/inward vision of divine power, and ta‟wīl i.e. allegorical interpretation of 
Islamic precepts (Abdul Husain n.d.: 73-74 ). The books in the fields of literature 
and history also capture this sectarian spirit. Evidently, therefore, cultivation and 
promotion of sectarian doctrines and tenets formed the fulcrum of the Surat 
College curricular activities. Clearly, therefore, the umma thus visualized is 
somewhat coterminous with the Dā‟ūdī Bohrā sectarian category, albeit not 
inconsonant with the broader Islamic worldview.
20
  
 
In his choice of diction, however, Abdul Husain betrays a clear influence of 
Eurocentric tropes. The degrees conferred upon the students in the College are thus 
also said to have parallels from the English academic world; thus the degree of 
shaykh, according to him, corresponds to an English University degree. It is easy to 
trivialize these traces of influence as too superficial; but the fact remains, for Abdul 
Husain this comparative approach added to the legitimization of his normative 
schema of “progress”, having roots in the European Enlightenment project. 
Carving a European model out of the Surat Dars — by stressing on its role in 
grooming the mashāyikh, the learned bureaucracy, the upholders of the true 
doctrines of the sect and finding parallels from the Western world — was integral 
to Abdul Husain‟s approach to rationalize the foundations of his sect, perceived to 
be suffering from problems of backwardness which necessitated his intervention.  
 
At this College, Abdul Husain adds, at least five hundred students were fed 
and lodged freely, the cost of maintenance being about Rupees 40,000. No clear 
reference to the exact date, however, is made here. Nevertheless, it is undeniable 
that the subsequent history of that College through the entire nineteenth century is 
one of gradual decline. This, however, need not be seen as an isolated instance. 
Indeed, the nineteenth century witnessed a gradual dismantlement of the 
indigenous system of education and its replacement by the English model that was 
articulated in the 1850s with such strength as never before. At the turn of the 
century it was recorded that around that time the College was kept up at a much 
reduced annual charge of about Rupees 10,000; no less than some 150-200 boys, 
                                                 
20
 The different modes of conceptualizing umma and the different resultant imports have 
been dealt with at length in recent years. For instance, seen primarily as a group of people 
bearing common characteristics, umma is also said to denote the different units which form 
a community, and can consequently imply, “a people, a society, a nation, a tribe, a culture, 
a multi-social, multi-cultural community in the sense it is used to describe Muslim 
civilization.” (Wyn Davies 1988: 128- 130; see also, 107- 108). For an evaluation of the 
multiple connotative paradigms of the term umma and the Orientalist discourse see M. J. al 
Faruqi (2005). 
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coming from different parts of India or even Arabia, were said to have been clothed 
and fed at that cost; they would stay for about three years and would be taught 
Arabic, geometry, logic, and law.
21
 In about twenty years time from then, Abdul 
Husain noted that the said College had reduced into a maktab, or primary school, 
“without good and devoted teachers” (n.d.: 75). 
 
In an era marked among other things by development of competing brands of 
religious nationalisms and efforts to arrive at identifying individual splinter 
communities, within the Islamic folds, with mainstream Islam,
22
Abdul Husain 
oscillates between the two alternatives of asserting the pristine identity of the 
Dā‟ūdī Bohrā “self” at one level and situating that community within the broader 
rubric of Islam. But as is evident from a dissection of his magnum opus, the latter 
was not an obvious choice (far less a political choice) for him and his primary 
concern remained his community, i.e. as he himself visualized, the Dā‟ūdī Bohrā 
community. With Abdul Husain locating his community in the Islamic landscape 
never involved a dilution of his own community‟s specificities. 
 
 
IV. APPROPRIATING “TRADITIONS”: THE CASE OF SIR ADAMJEE 
PEERBHOY’S SONS 
 
Around the second decade of the twentieth century another strand of socio-
religious reformism was underway among the Dā‟ūdī Bohrās. In due course its 
proponents, Sir Adamjee Peerbhoy and his sons, discovered themselves locked in a 
prolonged tirade against the Dā‟ūdī Bohrā Head-priest. Sir Adamjee‟s reformist 
concerns related firstly to the sphere of education; but unlike Abdul Husain he 
transcended its limits and sought to chart out the boundaries of his community, 
locating it within the South Asian Islamic universe with a declared political 
underpinning that found its expression in the newly founded All India Muslim 
league, of which he was the First President.  
 
Sir Adamjee Peerbhoy was no religious exegete. Coming from a sect — not 
considered by the vast majority of the Muslims to be one of them — he was no heir 
to any established Islamic tradition to which the dominant Sunnī circles might 
comfortably relate. But there is more to it. This reformer and merchant-prince was 
one of the largest cotton manufacturers of the time, who made his fortune by 
making supplies to the British army, and a politician with substantial influence in 
the local political power structure (being the Sheriff of Bombay, among other 
things). Thanks to him, by the second decade of the twentieth century sufficient 
progress had been made in the direction of integrating the Bohrās with the broader 
currents of South Asian Islam, thanks to the efforts of men like Sir Adamjee. For 
Sir Adamjee, forging links first with other sub-sects of the South Asian Islamic 
world, and then, with the dominant strands of Islamic worldview defined the 
problematic.
23
 This positive assertion of a specific language of identification with 
                                                 
21
 Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency, volume IX, Part 2, 1899 (Bombay, 1899), 32.  
22
 This trend is typified by personalities like Sir Adamjee Peerbhoy, leading Bohrā 
merchant, philanthropist, reformer and President of the First session of the All India 
Muslim League (1907); or H.H. Aga Khan III, spiritual head of the Khojas, whose life 
marked discernible efforts to situate the Nizāri Khoja within the Muslim rubric and strike a 
balance between these competing identities.   
23
 A clear identification of the thematic and the problematic elements in any social 
discourse (a nationalist discourse, in Partha Chatterjee‟s analysis) impinges upon the 
cognition of the morphology of such a discourse. The problematic component of any social 
ideology might be identified as the realm of historical assertions, or “practical realizability” 
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certain conceived view of mainstream Islam — in a period conceived of as one 
witnessing the crystallization of the concept of a “monolithic „Muslim 
community‟” (McPherson 2004) — was coupled with a vehement negation of the 
Bohrā sectarian socio-religious leadership‟s position. The latter trend — 
culminating under his sons after his demise — was worked out in the rooms of the 
Bombay High Court, leading in effect to a legal redefinition of the contours of the 
Head-priest‟s authority over religious and temporal aspects of the lives of the 
followers. The thematic justificatory mechanism, therefore, was substantially 
rooted in the legal rhetoric of the time. The colonial judicial system and its legal 
rhetoric became the definitive features of this brand of socio-religious reformist 
discourse and its justificatory modalities.
24
 Like his illustrious contemporary Abdul 
Husain, he too chose the field of education as his site of work, but unlike the 
former, he would take care to look beyond the boundaries of his community, and 
forge links with other communities. In 1885, in a letter written to the leading 
Indian National Congress member Sir Badruddin Tyabji, who came from the 
Sulaymānī sub-sect of the Bohrās, Sir Adamjee expressed his great disappointment 
at not being able to find adequate support (even among the Muslims of the city) to 
start a school for the Anjuman i Islam
25
 in Bombay. He then went on to request Sir 
Badruddin‟s intervention in the matter. But what makes this brief letter particularly 
interesting is Sir Adamjee‟s choice of idioms and diction. The opening sentence 
runs as follows: 
 
Referring to the personal interview which I had the pleasure to have with you 
in the company with (sic) other gentlemen of your Community in respect to 
the erection of a school of subject do not seem disposed to contribute towards 
this desirable object.
26
  
(emphasis mine). 
 
 
On his part, however, he expresses his willingness to offer monetary help to 
Sir Badruddin to start the school. Towards the end of the letter he further requests 
Sir Badruddin to “make it convenient personally to see the Chief members of our 
Community” so as to convince them of “the benefits desirable from the measures 
which you have in view for (sic) ameliorating the condition of our long neglected 
                                                                                                                            
of the same; and this becomes intelligible with reference to the justificatory claims and 
legitimizing modalities and tropes embedded in the field of the thematic. See Chatterjee, 
(1986: 36-53). This model gives us a conceptual framework with which to understand the 
morphological structure of any social discourse, in the present context the Bohrā socio-
religious discourse.  
24
 The crucial role of the colonial legislative system with regard to the formation of 
community identity, especially of communities inhabiting the interstitial spaces between 
the broader traditions of Hinduism or Islam, has been studied at length in recent years. For 
the conceptualization of Khoja identity around the mid-nineteenth century see, for example, 
Sodhan (2001).  
25
 The Bombay Anjuman-i-Islam was just one of the several Anjumans operating around 
the time; some others were the Anjuman Himayat-i-Islam, Lahore, or the Anjuman-i-
Islamia, Amritsar. See, in particular, Abdul Rashid Khan (2001: 60). The Bombay 
Anjuman was started in 1876 under the auspices of the Tyabjis and the ship-building 
tycoon Muhammad Ali Roghay with a view to promote an overall improvement of the 
Muslims. Nevertheless, from the very start the Anjuman had to struggle to convince the 
Bombay Muslims of its objectives. See Christine Dobbin, (1972: 231ff). In fact, the plan to 
establish an English school — as is evident from Sir Adamjee‟s letter cited here — is a 
classic case, testifying to the above point.  
26
 Sir Adamjee Peerbhoy to Sir Badruddin Tyabji, August 12, 1885, Bombay. NAI, the 
Tyabji Papers, Volume 1, Serial Number 24. 
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Community…”27 (emphasis mine). The oscillation between my community (i.e. the 
Dā‟ūdī Bohrās) and your community (i.e. the Sulaymānīs) is quite evident. 
Nevertheless, in contrast to Abdul Husain, Sir Adamjee labored to invoke an idea 
of common good and reach out to an over-arching theme of our community which 
in the present case implies certain vision of a broader Bohrā fraternity. This 
conceptualization of my community, your community, and most importantly, of 
improving the condition of “our long-neglected community” (emphasis mine), 
therefore hinged upon certain idea of communal solidarity, having religious 
underpinnings, and substantiated with reference to the discourse of persecution that 
the Bohrās and the Khojas were said to have undergone before the coming of the 
British.
28
 
 
The ingeniousness of Sir Adamjee‟s tryst with an enquiry of “selfhood” lies in 
the mutability of his system of thought — in tune with the broader political culture 
of the time — that betrayed a shift from religious sectarianism to definitive 
political orientations. Defining the boundaries of such a fuzzy community as his, 
and locating it within the Islamic folds depended squarely upon ironing out the 
traits peculiar to that community. This explains the vehement negation of the socio-
religious leadership among the Dā‟ūdī Bohrās that reached a fever-pitch under Sir 
Adamjee‟s sons in course of the Chandabhoy gulla law case. Embedded in the 
legal polemics of the time, it was thus an issue of more than just immediate 
religious import. This becomes intelligible against the backdrop of the 
development of a political discourse of a shared South Asian Muslim identity, 
accommodating the multitude of sects and groups. Sir Adamjee Peerbhoy was 
above all a visionary of this politico-intellectual genre. 
 
In the said law case the Plaintiffs, sons of Sir Adamjee, brought against the 
Head-priest charge of misappropriation of funds collected in the offertory box of 
Seth Chandabhoy‟s tomb.29 The original purpose of charity of the collected funds 
were said to be maintenance of the tomb; annual „urs feast, i.e. death anniversary, 
especially of a dāʻī al-muṭlaq, and majlis ceremony in honor of Seth Chandabhoy 
Currimbhoy; maintenance of the mosque; holding of a Ramaẓān feast; and any 
other charity which the dā„ī or his successors in office may deem to be of benefit 
for the Dā‟ūdī Bohrā community at large which, according to the Plaintiffs, should 
be the educational objectives. The Defendants, on the other hand, claimed that 
                                                 
27
 Ibid. 
28
 Indeed, for the vast majority of the Musta„līs and the Nizārīs, exposed to the atrocities of 
persecution throughout its history, the coming of the English had been a providential boon. 
In Muzaffar Shah‟s Gujarat, and during Aurangzeb‟s reign, the Bohrās and the Khojas were 
thus often harassed. See, for a translation into English of the Supplement to the late-Mughal 
Persian text Ali Muhammad Khan‟s Mirat I Ahmadi, Syed Nawab Ali and C. N. Seddon 
(1928: 109-110). See also Asghar Ali Engineer (1980: 100-141). As late as circa 1850, 
Richard Francis Burton saw some traces of mutual animosity and condemnation between 
the Sunnīs and the Khojas of Sind, in the course of his sojourn in the region. See Burton 
(1973 Reprint: 250). 
29
 Originally a wealthy merchant, Seth Chandabhoy is said to have attained “sainthood” 
upon his death and was claimed to be embodying the gamut of saintly attributes like, 
“piety, shrine, worshippers, offerings, intercession, miracles, anniversaries, feasts and 
illuminations”— a fact that did not go uncontested. Justice Marten, taking cue from Shaikh 
Faizullabhai‟s (A) Historical Sketch of the Bohra Highpriests (1916) went on to declare 
Seth Chandabhoy as a saint (wali) of a lower degree, as distinct from the saints of higher 
degree, represented by the Imāms and dāʻīs; the lack of his being canonized, however, is 
explained in terms of absence of such tradition in the Dāūdī Bohrā community. See 
Advocate General v. Yusuf Ali Ebrahim et al, (1921) All India Reporter Bombay 
(henceforth A.I.R. Bom.) 338. 
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while the suit properties were certainly not the personal properties of the Mullājī 
Saheb, the same nevertheless formed part of the da„wat properties. The term 
da„wat, according to the Mullājī Saheb, meant “the spiritual kingdom of the 
Dawoodi Borahs and their general affairs”.30 The Mullājī Saheb further claimed to 
hold the suit properties by virtue of his being the dā„ī al muṭlaq or Head of the 
community, a position that makes him unaccountable to anybody but the Imām for 
whatever he does. This virtual claim to infallibility hinged upon the activation of 
certain key practices and rituals, e.g. the oath of mīthāq — an oath of allegiance to 
God and the dāʻī al-muṭlaq. The oath is taken by all believers of the faith upon 
reaching puberty, and is also repeated annually in the month of zyl-Hajj. 
  
In course of the law case the very fundamentals of such rituals would be 
contested, stripping the Head-priest of the claim to infallibility. First and foremost 
what was challenged was the nature of contents of the very oath. On the basis of 
the first line of the third ruku from the Holy Qur‟ān, viz. “God purchased from all 
the faithful their souls and their property in consideration of Paradise”, and the 
central position of the dā„ī in the bāṭīnī weltanschauung, a total surrender to God 
and the kal mā„ṣum (like infallible) nay mā„ṣum (infallible) dā„ī was claimed from 
the faithful.
31
 Mīthāq was thus a key ritual of intensification. However, its 
precedent nature still did not go uncontested. The defense of Advocate General 
Inverarity, the Counsel of the Mullājī Saheb, building on the above quote from the 
Qur‟ān, proceeded along lines of establishing a chain connecting the dā„ī with 
God. However, the crux of this polemical diatribe nevertheless lay in the fact that 
any challenge to this schema of authority would be in effect tantamount to a 
challenge to the very foundational basis of the religious leadership. With Sir 
Adamjee‟s sons this challenge became stronger than ever before.32 
 
Interestingly, Abdul Husain‟s work would be taken up by Sir Adamjee‟s sons 
to buttress their own position, something that Mulla Abdul could have hardly 
intended. Abdul Husain‟s reference to a succession problem to the dā„ī‟s position 
was further taken up by Sir Adamjee‟s sons to prop up their critique of the dā„ī‟s 
claim to infallibility. Abdul Husain, basing his account on a late nineteenth century 
work which the Bohrās generally regard as their authentic history, recounts that 
towards the end of the nineteenth century “the unbroken chain of succession to the 
Dais by divine Right” was challenged for the first time resulting in, from the times 
of Sayyidnā Najm al-Dīn the 49th dāʻī (d.1323/1906), a debasement of the Head-
priestship into what he calls “management of the class organization” (i.e. 
Nizāmat).33 The critique, with all fairness, was not so much against the Head-
priest, as it was against the priestly class in general whom the Head-priest 
supposedly won over by way of grants of honors and position. Abdul Husain 
himself was careful to draw attention to this though, with decisive certitude, not 
challenging the Head-priest‟s position itself. His plea to gather support for the 
Head-priest Mullājī Saheb, however, did not save him from the wrath of the 
                                                 
30
 Advocate General v. Yusuf Ali Ebrahim et al, (1921) A. I. R. Bom. 338; see pages 340, 
and also 343- 344. 
31
 Ibid.: 343. 
32
 It has been also argued that the core argument of the reformers against the ritual was: the 
oath of allegiance was made more rigorous by Sayyidnā Taher Saif al-Dīn in the early part 
of the twentieth century, while the original version was much less rigorous.  This line of 
argument gradually crystallizes into the dissidents‟ Plaint in the Burhanpur Durgah Case, 
the Judgement for which was delivered in 1931. See Jonah Blank (2001: 320-321). 
33
 Abdul Husain‟s model was Shaikh Muhammad Ali Ibn Mulla Jiwabhai‟s Mausīm i bahār 
(Abdul Husain n.d.: 49ff). 
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daʻwat, and copies of his book are thus said to have been ruthlessly destroyed.34 
This further emanated from the fact that in spite of all his support to the Head-
priest, Abdul Husain was prudent enough to add that the highly centralized 
controlling system had no scriptural sanction (n.d.: 88). This was an innocuous 
statement coming from a thinker much mesmerized by the Eurocentric tropes of 
“progress” and trying, in his own way, to strike a balance between this schema of 
progress with Dā‟ūdī Bohrā sectarian culture. What emerges out of this is certain 
poly-semanticity of the idea of Progress. In his own words: 
 
The progressive party of the Bohras welcome the autocratic spiritual rule of 
their Head Priest, for they fully realise that this power if well and rightly 
directed will accustom the rude followers of his faith to the manners of Islam, 
and the bigoted Bohras will gladly take to secular training in the primary and 
the secondery (sic) schools if the training is combined with religious training.  
 
(n.d.: 78-79; emphasis mine) 
 
 
For a fuller picture of his mental world, however, one has to look at what he 
says just some pages down his work: 
In these days of liberty, freedom and democracy the bona-fide reformers do not 
claim any rival spiritual position or divine inspiration as Jafar, Ali, Suleman, 
Hibtulla, or Abdul Husain of Nagpore  did, but respectfully and humbly pray 
Syedna to restore the systematic teaching of the Esoteric doctrines of the Fatemide 
Lodge… (n.d.: 89-90). 
 
The latter reference among the secessionists is to one “Abdul Husain of 
Nagpur, son of Jiwabhai” who towards the end of the nineteenth century claimed 
direct communion with the Imām and, taking advantage of the internal problems 
within the da„wat owing to the succession question of the dā„ī around that time 
(referred to above), broke away from the Dā‟ūdī Bohrā community with a small 
following. From the name of the centre of its activities, this secessionist group 
derived its name Mehdibagwallas. Abdul Husain Jiwabhai, in Mulla Abdul 
Husain‟s view, was “a pretender, a man of very poor knowledge”, his whole 
enterprise being, “an assembly for worldly gain”, inhibitive of modern 
advancements (n.d.: 49-58). Interestingly enough, the legal trials initiated by Sir 
Adamjee‟s sons are also rather tangentially dealt with, and indeed with no explicit 
reference:  
 
the unfortunate events leading to litigation at Bombay, Amreli, Ujjain, 
Bhopal, and Burhanpore go to expose the mismanagement and incompetency 
(sic) of the priest classes.
35
 
 
 
It is an irony that selected parts of a tract — professed to be steadfast in 
support of the Head-priest‟s position and indeed critical of the contemporaneous 
secessionist tendencies and litigations — came to be used as a source material in 
                                                 
34
 See the introductory note by H.K. Sanchawala, publisher of the 1977 reprint volume of 
Gulzare Daudi, and who also happened to be the editor of the Dawoodi Vohra Bulletin. 
(Abdul Husain 1977 Reprint). 
35
 See Abdul Husain, (n.d.: 89); the argument is revisited, almost with the same rhetoric, in 
page 120. The “arbitrary power” of the priestly class to appropriate waqf property is 
challenged also in page 114. 
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the making of a very different brand of legal rhetoric. Its appropriation and 
selective employment by the other reformist strand, having definitive political 
underpinning, shows how elements of socio-religious reformism,  encoded in a 
particular text, could be subjected to a different set of interpretive paradigms, and 
utilized by political projects of building consensus in a community, thus attesting 
to a relative instrumentality of leadership as the Brass model suggests.
36
  
 
By the first decade of the twentieth century, Sir Adamjee had gradually 
emerged as an avid proponent of the interests of “the Mohammedans of India”, and 
presiding at the First session of the All-India Muslim League exhorting “the true 
children of Islam” to follow the path of advancement.37 Indeed, this called for some 
justificatory anchorage in certain specific version of Islam and depiction of the 
image of the Prophet, as illustrated in his Presidential Address first session of the 
Muslim League: 
 
I believe in the dignity of labour as the great Prophet did. The history of our 
people, the history of our heroes and of those who have carried the flag of 
Islam over the world has been one of strenuous and ceaseless effort… I 
believe it is along these lines that he can best exert his influence and carve for 
himself a high position in the Empire.  
(Pirzada 1969: 19; emphasis mine). 
 
 
Given this specific mode of interpretation of certain classical Islamic values 
and Prophetic ideals that Sir Adamjee arrived at, it will probably not be an 
exaggeration to locate him, above all, in a qualified “contextualist” tradition 
seeking to balance and interpret classical Islamic and Qur‟ānic ethico-theological, 
nay politico-legal, systems in the light of broader socio-historical contexts.
38
 
Furthermore, this exhortation for a certain entrepreneurial character is no longer 
confined within the limits of the Bohrā sect. “Our people” and “our heroes” 
(emphasis mine) have now been equated willy-nilly with the broader Muslim 
community in general. Some anticipation of bridging the gulf could be located in 
1906, when he made generous donations of some Rs. 1, 10, 000 for a science 
college at Aligarh (Pirzada 1969: 16). Providing leadership in the field of education 
was one of the different vehicles of reconciliation — if somewhat symbolic — and 
reaching out to the broader Islamic worldview, whereby conscious efforts would be 
made to dilute the individualizing tendencies and sectarian identities. This needs to 
be studied in conjunction with the broader politico-educational backdrop of “the 
                                                 
36
 Cf., for an interesting analogy, how history gets its “explanatory effect” partly through 
the vehicle of what Hayden White calls “emplotment” or “the encodation of the facts 
contained in the chronicle [historical text] as components of specific kinds of plot 
structures…” See White (1987: 83).  
37
 The Presidential Address of Sir Adamjee at the First session of the All-India Muslim 
League, Karachi, December 29-30, 1907. See Pirzada (1969: 16 ff). 
38
 I borrow the term from Abdullah Saeed (2008) and make a broadened use of it. Saeed 
uses it to understand Qur‟ānic “ethico-legal” parameters in the context of specific socio-
historical backdrops; I have, instead, used it to include diverse shades of Islamic ethico-
theological and politico-legal discursive traditions as well. It is difficult to map the contours 
of the intellectual horizon of this so-called “Contextualist school” as it could well include 
exponents, ranging from “Progressive Ijtehadis” down to traditionists with reformist bent, 
but sharing in common a general approach towards the Holy Book and Traditions, viz. 
attaching varying degrees of importance to the broader socio-historical contexts in 
determining the pertinence of Qur‟ānic ethico-legal systems. See Saeed (2008).  
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Muslim University movement” of the early twentieth century that was, at once, an 
enterprise to evolve a specific cultural definition while at the same time carving out 
an all-India Muslim constituency (Gail Minault and David Lelyveld 1974). This 
goes to show how, despite decisive degree of agency with which leaderships could 
function, they were nevertheless constrained by set patterns of religio-cultural 
norms — with appeal to the people they claimed to represent — to fall back upon 
while campaigning for consensus (Robinson 1979: 80ff; cf. Quentin Skinner 1974). 
Indeed, the degree of elite maneuver, for all their crucial importance, is always 
conditioned by the broader contextual choices they get. Sir Adamjee‟s rational 
choice, his journey of defining “selfhood” that had begun around late nineteenth 
century, flirting with mapping the contours of a Bohrā fraternity, had thus come to 
a full circle by early twentieth century when certain links had been successfully 
forged with the broader umma of South Asia. This poltico-cultural project was later 
propped up by his sons when they dragged their religious head to law court and 
demarcated the boundaries of the spiritual leadership in strict legal terms. 
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
With the development of competing brands of religious nationalism from the late 
nineteenth century onwards, smaller sects and splinter-groups often inhabiting the 
interstitial spaces traditionally falling under the folds of neither Hinduism nor 
Islam and bearing their own specificities were virtually left with no practicable 
option but to identify with either of the broader religious categories of Hindus or 
Muslims. Sectarian leaderships thus from time to time, though not necessarily in all 
instances, sought to fuse sectarian values with the broader Islamic/ Hindu 
nationalist forces; but what they saw as rational choice, was also conditioned by 
their contextual specificities. This involved constant negotiation between the 
different currents of self-perception sometimes leading to qualified utilization of 
tools picked up from smaller sectarian repertoire.  It is in this light that the 
appropriation of some of the elements of Abdul Husain‟s system of thought by Sir 
Adamjee and his sons should be seen.  
 
The life and works of Mulla Abdul Husain exemplify certain brand of social 
reformism characterized by conscious efforts to harmonize the tropes of 
Rationality and Progress, with pristine sectarian values. Tempered with selective 
employment of European values and phraseology, the viabilities of his specific 
brand of adab thus hinged upon the approximation of values which had certain 
Dā‟ūdī Bohrā “tradition” as its core. In his efforts to address the question what it 
meant to be a Dā‟ūdī Bohrā, Abdul Husain arrived at a restricted vision of that 
community, though also touching upon the problem of situating it in the greater 
Islamic rubric. It was, however, bereft of any stark political agenda, as typified by 
Sir Adamjee in particular, and his sons. In other words, whereas Abdul Husain 
embodied one brand of “Islamic activism”, Sir Adamjee represented the emerging 
“Islamist” political culture of the time.39Abdul Husain was first and foremost a 
Dā‟ūdī Bohrā, concerned with reformist issues of that community, seeking to 
rediscover its identity along pristine sectarian lines. His enquiry into such issues of 
social reformism convinced him of the need for certain revitalization — albeit in a 
qualified way — of the sectarian tenets and practices. It is this concern that not 
only occasioned his polemical engagement, but in fact conditioned the entire work, 
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 For Dietrich Reetz‟s distinction of the two concepts, see f.n. 4 above. 
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shaping it as a work meant for the Dā‟ūdī Bohrās, coming from a Dā‟ūdī Bohrā. 
His epistemic construction of the history, culture and religious tradition of the 
Dā‟ūdī Bohrās represent a specific strand of early reformist-intellectual tradition 
coming from within the community, and thus betraying certain image of the “self”.  
 
On the other hand, proceeding from a stage where the different branches of 
the Bohrās were still involved in the process of negotiation to evolve a common 
conceptual category of Bohrā brotherhood, Sir Adamjee actually ended up in 
constantly defining and redefining the boundaries of his own community 
consummating eventually in linking it with a specific Islamic weltanschauung, an 
“Islamist” enterprise, to use Reetz‟s terminology, as opposed to the Indian National 
Congress politics first, and then the rising Hindu nationalism, also seen as an 
essentially political creation deriving ideological roots in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, but finding articulation since the 1920s, thanks once 
again to the instrumentality of the elites (Jaffrelot 1996: 25). The intriguing part of 
Sir Adamjee Peerbhoy‟s system of thought lies in his enabling a development of a 
specific brand of religious nationalism, buttressed by an array of justificatory 
modalities impinging on the need for building consensus within the Muslim 
fraternity of South Asia, forging the smaller sects together. The idioms of 
reconciliation, which stemmed from this, enabled individual communities and sub-
sects relocating themselves, along socio-political lines, within a broader worldview 
shared by the Muslims of South Asia. 
 
The present enquiry was an effort to outline these two reformist-intellectual 
traditions, touching upon the question as to how one could become the source of 
validation of another, developing in a specific political matrix. Indeed, if an 
assimilation of the Bohrās with the broader currents of Islam in the sub-continent 
along socio-political lines was ever to happen, a clear specification of the Head-
priest‟s social and religious position and of the boundaries of his authority stood as 
a crucial precondition. The employment of parts of Abdul Husain‟s socio-religious 
concerns by Sir Adamjee‟s sons was, viewed in this light, the means to arrive at the 
specific end of building consensus among the different branches of South Asia‟s 
Muslims that their father had championed, betraying a crucial shift from the 
religious towards politico-legal orientations. 
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